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While there is a consensus that the 2008-2009 crisis was triggered by financial market disruptions in the United States, there is little agreement on whether the transmission of the crisis and the subsequent prolonged recession are due to credit factors or to a collapse of demand for goods and services. This paper assesses whether the primary effect of the global crisis on Eastern European firms took the form of an adverse demand shock or a credit crunch. Using a unique firm survey conducted by the World Bank in six Eastern European countries during the 2008-2009 financial crisis, This paper is a product of the Macroeconomics and Growth Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at hanguyen@worldbank.org. the paper shows that the drop in demand for firms' products and services was overwhelmingly reported as the most damaging adverse effect of the crisis. Other "usual suspects," such as rising debt or reduced access to credit, are reported as minor. The paper also finds that the changes in firms' sales and installed capacity are significantly and robustly correlated with the demand sensitivity of the sector in which the firms operate. However, they are not robustly correlated with various proxies for firms' credit needs.
Introduction
The role of credit and demand factors in the 2008-2009 financial crisis is still not well understood. A negative credit shock to firms is generally thought of as a credit crunch-a reduction in the general availability of loans, or a sudden tightening of the conditions required to obtain a loan from the banks.
Credit crunches squeeze firms' working capital and cripple their production. On the other hand, adverse demand shocks to firms come from general declines in demand for firms' products and services (i.e. a shift of the demand curve). While there is a consensus among researchers and policy makers that the 2008-2009 crisis was triggered by financial market disruptions in the United States, there is little agreement on whether the transmission of the crisis and the subsequent prolonged recession are due to credit factors or to a collapse of demand for the goods and services. Each type of factors has fundamentally different policy prescriptions. If credit factors are found to play the main role, the main prescription involves providing more and cheaper credit, directly injecting credit and liquidity to banks, or issuing loan guarantees. On the other hand, if demand factors are the main drivers, the focus should be on boosting investors' and consumers' confidence. Fiscal policies and the reduction of uncertainty regarding fiscal, monetary and regulatory policy are the conventional instruments in this case.
The existing literature almost exclusively focuses on the credit side to explain the transmission and propagation of the crisis. Recent theoretical contributions by Mendoza (2010) , Devereux and Yetman (2010) , Perri and Quadrini (2011) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al (2012) generally argue for a strong role of credit market frictions in the propagation and transmission of the crisis, following a long tradition starting from Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) . An exception is Van Wincoop (2013) , who develops a two-country model with leveraged financial institutions to show that the model cannot account for the impact of the crisis and the extent of the transmission.
Perhaps due to the strong influence of a well-established theoretical literature, the empirical literature also focuses on the credit side.
2 Tong and Wei (2011) use data on 3,823 listed firms in 24 emerging countries and find declines in stock prices to be, on average, more severe for firms intrinsically more dependent on external finance. Cowan and Raddatz (2013) European countries, this paper shows that the drop in demand for firms' products and services is very severe, and is reported as the most damaging factor on firms in these countries. In addition, the firms' change in sales is significantly correlated with the sector's demand sensitivity, and not with various proxies used for firms' dependence on external finance.
Our paper has two main contributions. First, it provides evidence about the relative importance of demand and credit shocks on firms. It is probably not so surprising that in this severe crisis, both credit and demand factors are at play. Different studies have indeed pointed out that both credit and demand factors have negative impacts on firms during the crisis. Nevertheless, it is important to be able to provide some evidence about the relative important of the factors because they have fundamentally different policy emphases. Traditionally, with balance sheet data it is difficult to directly compare the relative impacts of the two factors. The World Bank's Financial Crisis Survey is unique in that it asks firms to judge directly demand and credit channels, among others. While subjective, the data strongly indicate that declining demand is more important for the vast majority of firms.
Our second contribution is regarding the representativeness of the sample. The comprehensive coverage of the survey allows us to look at impacts on a more representative set of firms. In this sense our paper complements the existing literature. Wei (2011) and Claessens, Tong and Wei (2012) use data of publicly listed firms, which are generally large and well-established. Because of the data constraint, they do not include actions for small and medium firms, which constitute the majority fraction of the economy. The World Bank's Financial Crisis Survey collected data from a more random set of firms (see section 2 for data description), which allows us to examine the impacts on small and private firms -those that can potentially be more vulnerable to demand shocks or credit shocks. Our results show that firm size does not seem to matter for sales, but it does for firms' capacity and employment, in opposite ways.
While small firms' capacity is significantly more correlated with demand and credit sensitivities than large firms', small firms' employment is significantly less so.
One might argue that a decline in demand for firms' goods and services can still be a credit problem because the decline in firms' demand is due to consumers' reduced access to credit. Table A2 in the Appendix), which runs counter to the argument that large firms are more prone to credit crunches and less to demand shocks.
Data
The Firms in the BEEPS survey are more representative than in previous studies, e.g., Tong and Wei, (2011) and Claessens, Tong, and Wei, (2012) . Previous studies focused only on large listed firms and were criticized for not including small firms, where the impacts of either demand or credit shocks can be particularly severe (because of the relatively lack of access to finance for example). The World Bank's Even for firms that have some ongoing credit relationship with lenders, demand is still the number-one factor. People tend to look into firms that are more dependent on external finance to find some impacts of potential credit crunches. Indeed in our sample, "reduced access to credit" is more often reported by firms that had loans before the crisis than those that did not. However, the difference is not large (10 v.s. 5 percent). Among 857 firms that had loans in 2007, 67 percent pointed to demand as the main factor in 2009, only slightly less than those that did not have loans. Firms in less demand-sensitive sectors such as food are least likely to report a drop in demand. We examine the issue of demand sensitivity more carefully in the next section.
There is a very strong link between reporting demand shocks as the main cause and the actual sale performance. Firms that reported a drop in the demand as the main effects witness larger declines in sales.
The decline in sales is 31 percent on average for firms that report "drop in demand of products and services" as the number one impact, whereas the decline is 20 percent for firms that do not do so. The difference is significant at the 1 percent level.
To sum up, we see a surprisingly overwhelming fraction of firms that claim the drop in demand as the most important factor for their worsening performance. Credit shocks, the usual suspect that was much more thoroughly examined in numerous studies, was reported by much fewer firms. This is robust for all firm sizes, for all sectors, for all three waves, and for all countries. While only subjective, the evidence is decidedly clear that demand declines are the number one concern for firms.
Demand versus credit factors: An econometric analysis
This section provides evidence on the impact of the change in demand on the performance and operation of firms in the crisis. The main indicators for firms' performance and operation are firms' sales, employment, and capacity at the first wave of the crisis. We find that the change in firm sales and the change in capacity are significantly and negatively correlated with firms' demand sensitivity; and this is robust across specifications. We do not find a significant and robust relationship between firm sales and capacity with various proxies for credit dependence before the crisis. We also look at the change in fulltime permanent employment, but do not find a relationship between it and either demand nor credit sensitivity.
The details of the dependent variables are below: The details of the explanatory variables are below:
1. Sensitivity to demand shocks:
Establishing demand sensitivity is difficult. A traditional approach is to measure the correlation between a firm's sales and aggregate output, and take it as a proxy for demand sensitivity. In our view this is not satisfactory because we are not sure if demand shocks drive the correlation between sales and aggregate output. The simple correlation can capture many other shocks, such as productivity shocks and access to credit shocks. For example, an improvement in a one sector's technology (e.g. an introduction of new smart phones) would stimulate sales of that industry and at the same time increase total output.
We follow the approach of Tong and Wei (2008) to define the proxy for demand sensitivity. The proxy is at the sector level, based on U.S. data. 7 It is the change in stock index by sector in a 10-day period following the September 11, 2001 attack, which is presumably a demand shock. The idea is that the terrorist attack caused temporary psychological setback, which can be considered as a negative demand shock to consumers, as firms' technology and banks' lending capacity remained intact. Firstly, airline stocks were disproportionately hit. Second, stocks in defense industry may have seen some 7 The use of U.S. based industry data on demand and credit sensitivities and extrapolating to other countries is popular (see for example Rajan and Zingales (1998); Raddatz (2006); Claessens, Tong and Wei (2012) ). This is to overcome the lack of data in many countries. As noted by Rajan and Zingales (1998) , the estimator will be unbiased if the industry ranking of demand sensitivity or liquidity needs is preserved across countries.
boost because investors might have expected more military activities to respond to the attack. We try to minimize the drawbacks in our study by using industry transportation stock index as opposed to passenger transportation index to represent transportation sector's demand sensitivity. We are not too concerned about firms in the defense industry because one, they are very few in these countries, and two, if there are any, they would be categorized in "Other manufacturing" which we do not include in our regressions.
2. Credit Proxies: Measuring credit needs is more established in the literature. We create three proxies for credit needs. The first two are at sector level, based on U.S. data, while the third is at the firm level based on 2007 BEEPS.
a. The first credit proxy is dependence on external finance by sector (following Rajan and Zingales (1998) ). A firm's dependence on external finance is defined as capital expenditures minus cash flow from operations divided by capital expenditures. This is to capture external finance needed for investment. A higher number implies that capital expenditure is high compared to the cash flows, which means the industry has to rely more on external finance.
Note that the proxy is only available for manufacturing firms. Table A4 in the Appendix presents the details.
b. The second credit proxy is the cash conversion cycle (following Raddatz (2006) ). This is to capture external finance needed for working capital. The cycle measures the time elapsed from the moment a firm pays for its inputs to the moment it receives payment for the goods it sells. The higher the cycle, the more firms depend on external finance for its operation. Raddatz (2006) provides the index for 4-digit ISIC sectors in the United States, also limited to manufacturing. Please see Table A5 in the Appendix for details.
c. The third proxy is generated from the dataset. It is the proportion of a firm's total purchase of fixed assets in fiscal year 2007 that was financed from retained earnings, owners' contribution or from issuing new equity. This proxy tries to capture how dependent the firm is on external finance with their asset purchases before the crisis, or how accessible external finance was to a firm before the crisis. The higher the value of the proxy, the less dependent the firm is to external finance. An upside of this proxy is that it is firm-specific. A downside is that it only covers firms that have data on investment and finance. c. Foreign ownership (=1 if 50% of the firm's stake is owned by foreigners).
4. Country fixed effects: to capture unobservable countries' characteristics.
The summary statistics are at Table A7 in the Appendix. The correlations between credit and demand proxies are at Table A8 .
We first run OLS regressions with country fixed effects. The regressions are adjusted to take into account the weight of stratified random sample. We focus first on the change in sales. The results are reported in Table 1 . Wei (2011) and Claessens, Tong and Wei (2012) ). They also find a significant impact of the demand channel, but they only focus on large listed firms.
While the impact of the demand channel is clear, we do not see a clear impact of firms' credit characteristics on the change in firm sales between July 2008 and July 2009. None of the proxies we use for firms' dependence on external finance seem to matter much when introduced by itself. Among all proxies for credit sensitivity, only Cash Conversion Cycle is marginally significant, but it is not robust.
When both demand sensitivity and the proxies for firm's credit characteristics are introduced, only demand sensitivity remains robust and significant. None of the three proxies for credit needs is robustly significant (only dependence on external finance becomes significant in one specification, but with the wrong sign). In addition, we interact the small-firm dummy with each demand and credit sensitivity proxy to find potential differential impacts on small firms. We do not find any differential impacts (results not shown here).
As a robustness check, we rerun the regression but replace the change in sales by a dummy variable representing reporting demand as the main factor. The dummy variable equals 1 if the firm reports demand as the main factor to cause damage to the firm, 0 otherwise. We would like to be sure that more demand sensitive firms are more likely to declare that demand channel matters most. Results in Table 2 indeed show this is the case. Reporting demand shocks is strongly correlated with demand sensitivity, and Similarly we run the regression with the dependent variable "reporting reduced access to credit as the main factor". Table 3 shows that none of the credit variables is alone significantly correlated with the dummy variable (dependence on External Finance is an exception when it becomes significant if we include demand sensitivity). This implies two possibilities: it could be that the credit proxies do not capture actual credit needs. We discount this possibility because the proxies are well-established and used extensively in the literature. Another possibility is that many credit dependent firms were also hit harder by demand shocks, and hence did not report reduced access to credit as the main factor. We lean towards this possibility, because indeed when controlled for demand sensitivity, dependence on external finance becomes significant.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Subsequently we run OLS regressions with country fixed effects, focusing on the remaining dependent variables, which are the change in firms' capacity and employment. Capacity indicates the current utilization rate of all the resources at the time of the interview, as a percent of the maximum output possible using all resources available. Since we are not sure if the total resources remain unchanged between June 2009, and at the end of 2007, we take the results with caution. For example, in the case when a firm was hit by the crisis and sold some of its machinery, the total resources decline. This would inflate the utilization rate and distort our results. Table 4 shows that the change in capacity is strongly influenced by demand sensitivity. The results are significant and very robust across specifications. Regarding the unconditional impact, for a 1 percent additional decline in a sector's stock index after Sep 11, 2011, firms in that sector saw a 1.89 percent decline in capacity between June/July 2009 and at the end of 2007. The impact remains robust with other control variables (although the magnitude is somewhat reduced). Also quite interestingly, among credit factors, Cash Conversion Cycle now is strongly significantly correlated with the change in capacity. This implies that financial need for working capital matters for the firms' operation. However, this is not robust: when we control for demand sensitivity, cash conversion cycle is no longer significant.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) With capacity we see differential impacts of demand sensitivity and credit needs on small and large firms.
For a 1 percent decline in the stock price, small firms see capacity falls by an additional 0.69 percent compared to large firms. The impact of external finance needs (via the proxy Cash Conversion Cycle) is also steeper for small firms than for large firms. Other interactions between small firm dummy and other proxies are not significant; and therefore not shown here.
Lastly, we examine the impact of demand and credit sensitivity on the change in full-time permanent workers between June 2009 and at the end of 2007 fiscal year. Table 5 shows that none of credit or demand proxies is robustly associated with the change in full-time labor 9 . 9 We also examine the change in full-time temporary workers, and do not see an impact of demand sensitivity either. However the small sample of firms declaring temporary workers in both periods is very small (85 firms total), preventing us from reaching a meaningful conclusion.
(1) demand or credit sensitivities. One potential explanation is that employment decisions, particularly those about permanent full-time employment are more forward-looking. Since investing and training permanent workers is costly, firms only let the workers go when they do not see good prospect for firms' products and services in the future. In other words, the employment decision today is driven by the expectation about the future demand for the firms' products and services. Indeed we see some evidence of that the expected change in sales one year from June 2009 is significantly correlated with the change in employment (see table A8 ). In other words, if a firm expected sales to improve, they significantly retain more full-time permanent workers.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) We also find that small firms' full-time permanent employment is less sensitive to demand than large firms'. As we can see in Table 5 , for a 1percent decline in a sector stock price, the decline in small firms' employment in that sector, on average, is 2.7 percent smaller than that in large firms. In other words, large firms' employment is more negatively correlated to demand sensitivity. One possible reason is that for small firms, firing workers is more costly. This is because the cost of finding and training good workers for small firms are probably higher, or perhaps the relationship between firms' owners and workers are closer and more personal than in large firms, thus making the firing more difficult. We also interact the small firm dummy with the credit proxies but do not find differential impacts of credit needs on small firms.
Conclusion
Drawing from The World Bank's Financial Crisis Enterprise Survey, this paper presents evidence for the dramatic declines of demand for firms in six Eastern European countries and their impact on firms'
operation. An overwhelming majority of firms report the change in demand as the main effect and as the main cause for the improvement or further worsening of their businesses during the crisis. We find that changes in sales and capacity are significantly and negatively correlated with firms' demand sensitivity, and not with various proxies for firms' dependence on external finance before the crisis.
The results seem to suggest demand factors play a more important role in the firms' performance during the crisis. Note that the results do not suggest that demand factors triggered the crisis-it might very well be the case that credit shocks did. Our conjecture is that as the crisis drags on, demand factors became more prominent. This has important policy implications. Since it is currently a demand problem, the focus should be on boosting investors' and consumers' confidence. Fiscal policies are the conventional instruments in this case. 
